Abstract. An important debate in the literature on exurban sprawl is whether low-density development results from residential demand, as operationalized by developers, or from exclusionary zoning policies. Central to this debate is the purpose of zoning, which could alternatively be a mechanism to increase the utility of residents by separating land uses and reducing spillover effects of development, or an obstacle to market mechanisms that would otherwise allow the realization of residential preferences. To shed light on this debate, we developed an agent-based model of land-use change to study how the combined effects of zoning-enforcement levels, density preferences, preference heterogeneity, and negative externalities from development affect exurban development and the utility of residents. Our computational experiments show that sprawl is not inevitable, even when most of the population prefers low densities. The presence of negative externalities consistently encourage sprawl while decreasing average utility and flattening the utility distribution. Zoning can reduce sprawl by concentrating development in specific areas, but in doing so decreases average utility and increases inequality. Zoning does not internalize externalities; instead, it contains externalities in areas of different development density so that residents bear the burden of the external effects of the density they prefer. Effects vary with residential preference distributions and levels of zoning enforcement. These initial investigations can help inform policy makers about the conditions under which zoning enforcement is preferable to free-market development and vice versa. Future work will focus on the environmental impacts of different settlement patterns and the role land-use and market-based policies play in this relationship.
restricted by zoning, which affects only the maximum density of residents allowed at each location. By explicitly representing individual and policy land-use decisions, the external effects of those decisions, and the interactions among these factors, our ABM allows us to explore the implications of our assumptions and hypotheses in a controlled manner. We explore the effects of varying degrees of zoning enforcement, ranging from rigid density regulations to flexible variances that respond to demand for higher densities. We examine the relationship between zoning enforcement and (1) the spatial expansion of development as a simple measure of sprawl, (1) (2) the average residential utility, and (3) the distribution of residential utility. We also look at the influence of`negative externality' effects of development (that is, the environmental and aesthetic deterioration caused by development borne by parties that are not involved in the transaction) on sprawl and measures of utility. We test whether zoning can reduce the dispersion caused by these externalities and their impact on utility measures. These findings would support zoning (or not) as a tool to correct market inefficiencies. Finally, we examine the effects of various density-preference distributions across the population of residents, ranging from low to high density for both homogeneous and heterogeneous populations. While earlier studies show that heterogeneity increases sprawl, they do not examine the effect of heterogeneity when the mean of the preference distribution varies. We hypothesize that more compact patterns may result from different distributions of density preferences, even if these preferences are heterogeneous.
The next section explains our modeling approach and parameters. We then present some results from various zoning, density preference, and externality scenarios and discuss their policy implications. We conclude with a discussion of future explorations.
The model
ABMs are computer-based programs that can be used to study the global consequences of local interactions (Miller and Page, 2007) . ABMs typically consist of a framework in which agents interact with each other and a nonagent environment. The environment is represented as a two-dimensional or three-dimensional grid, and each cell may have attributes and states. Agents may have a specific location in space, and choose their location according to the agents' unique set of preferences and rules of behavior, and the landscape characteristics. Agents' and environmental states can be recorded as they change in each run of the model, and a series of outcomes can then be analyzed statistically to identify emergent properties and patterns. In this manner, ABMs can integrate the social, economic, and environmental aspects that drive land-use and land-cover processes and help us to understand the dynamics of integrated urbanenvironment systems. Example applications of ABMs to land-use change and policy include an evaluation of the effects of greenbelts around a growing city (Brown et al, 2004) , the examination of farmer behaviors in response to neighbors' decisions and agricultural policies (Polhill et al, 2001; Sengupta et al, 2005) , the analysis of policies aimed at attaining compact development (Kii and Doi, 2005) , the simulation of alternative development scenarios (Ligmann-Zielinska and Jankowski, 2007) , the assessment of water management policies in urban fringes (Ducrot et al, 2004) , and modeling of the effects of land-use and water-use policies on groundwater sustainability (Zellner, 2007) .
The model we present here was developed in SWARM (2) using agents that have preferences for different attributes of particular spatial locations. These agents locate on a two-dimensional grid, which can be overlaid with a range of hypothetical policy and
(1) There are, in fact, several definitions of sprawl as a process, a pattern and the effects it produces (see, for example, Johnson, 2001 ). Here we focus only on sprawl as an effect of physical expansion.
(2) A complete description of this tool can be accessed at www.swarm.org natural landscapes. From specific combinations of preferences, land-use policies, and externalities that serve as inputs, this model generates output measures that describe the distributions of spatial development patterns and welfare among agents. These measures include: (1) the number of cells developed beyond a specific radius from the center, (2) residential density versus distance from the center, and (3) the average and Gini coefficient of utility levels among resident agents. The Gini coefficient is used to measure the distribution of wealth in a population (Sen, 1973) . The coefficient varies between 0, indicating perfect equality, and 1, indicating extreme inequality. The model described here is composed of three primary parts: the environment, the agents, and the agent interaction with the environment. Each of these parts is explained in detail in the following subsections.
The environment
We represent the geographic space with an 80 Â 80 square lattice so that each cell is defined by (x, y) coordinates. Each cell has four characteristics: (1) the maximum allowed density, ranging from 0.0 to 1.0, where a density of 1.0 corresponds to a maximum of five residents per cell, which is set by an exogenously specified zoning map; (2) a probability that a zoning variance will be granted that increases the density at which the cell can be developed, which is set for all cells by an exogenously specified parameter ( r), ranging between 0.0, where zoning is implemented without exception, and 1.0, where the first resident into the cell sets the maximum density to its preference, that is, zoning responds to individual demand in an unrestricted land market; (3) proximity to service centers, which is the inverse of the average Euclidean distance to the eight nearest service centers normalized between 0.0 and 1.0 (a proximity of 1.0 is closest), updated every time a new service center is created and added to the map, and (4) aesthetic quality, an arbitrary value in the range 0.0 to 1.0, representing both the aesthetic and ecological quality of a cell.
The agents
The basic agent types are service centers and residents. Service centers represent both commercial and employment centers, take up a whole cell in the lattice, and have no characteristic attributes. Residents, on the other hand, can share a cell with other residents and are characterized by preferences for three aspects of a location: (1) proximity to service centers (s); (2) cell density (c), and (3) aesthetic quality (a). An agent's preferences for each of these three location aspects are defined by two parameters: b j , the agent's ideal value for an aspect j ( j P fs, c, ag) and a j , the weight (importance) the agent gives to that specific aspect. The distribution of the preference value across agents is set to be either homogeneous or heterogeneous (defined by a normal distribution with a given mean and variance). In the simulations we present here, we assume that all residents prefer short distances to services (that is, b s 1X0, since proximity is inversely related to actual distance) and high levels of aesthetic quality (that is, b a 1X0), and that all factors are equally important (that is all a values are identical). This allows us to focus on the effects of different levels of preferred density, b c .
Agent behavior
When an agent chooses a location on the lattice, it transforms the landscape, affecting the decisions of subsequent agents and the resulting pattern. It does this directly by taking up a position on the lattice, but it also alters the landscape indirectly by affecting the choices of other agents, and by possibly affecting the zoning for that lattice location. Every run starts with an intial service center located at the center of the lattice, representing a new commercial and employment center in the hypothetical exurban region. In a time step of the model, a new group of ten residents enters the map. Each new resident looks at a number of randomly selected cells (fifteen for our experiments) that have not reached the maximum allowed density and evaluates them using a hedonic utility calculation to make their decisions about where to live, taking into account cell density, distance to service centers, and aesthetic quality. The utility U of a given cell for a given agent is:
where b a is the agent's ideal (preferred) value for aesthetic quality, A is the cell's value for aesthetic quality, a a is the importance of aesthetic quality to the agent, b s is the agent's ideal proximity to service centers, S is the cell's average proximity to nearest eight service centers, a s is the importance of distance to service centers to the agent, b c is the agent's ideal cell density, C is the density of the cell, a c is the importance of cell density to the agent. Due to the assumptions we have made in our experiments, the number of variables in equation (1) is reduced and the utility equation (1) becomes:
Each resident moves into the cell from which it can derive the highest utility (with ties broken randomly). This represents a rational decision process, but, because the agents only evaluate fifteen randomly selected cells before making their choice, agent rationality is bounded by incomplete information about the housing market. This same utility function is used to update the utility of each resident in the lattice at every time step, so an agent's utility may change over time as other residents enter its neighbourhood.
The multiplicative utility function assumes that the preferences are dependent; for example, being close to a service center is irrelevant of the preferences for density and aesthetic quality are not met to some extent. Previous work shows that the use of an additive function, where preferences are independent of each other, does not lead to significant differences in the resulting development patterns, although the multiplicative utility function exacerbates the differences between homogeneous and heterogeneous populations making the difference easier to analyze (Rand et al, 2002) .
Demand for higher densities than zoning allows
The number of residents that can move into each cell is determined by how zoning is enforced in that cell. In the absence of zoning constraints, when the first resident moves in, that resident sets the maximum cell density for that cell to be equal to the resident's preferred density. This is intended to reflect a developer's decision to build at a density that responds to the demand of a portion of the population. When zoning is in place, the maximum cell density may be constrained to be less than the initial resident prefers. When this occurs, the agent must either accept the lower density specified by the zoning map, or it must obtain a variance to allow higher densities. The zoning parameter r sets the probability at which a zoning variance may be granted for each cell (see subsection 2.1). A resident considers this probability when evaluating empty cells for location, so that the lower the probability of granting a variance, the lower the utility that an agent will derive from a cell that is zoned for lower densities:
If an agent moves into an empty cell zoned for a lower density than the one preferred by that agent, the agent will seek a variance for the density preferred, which will be granted with a probability equal to the zoning parameter. If the variance is not granted, the maximum cell density is determined by the current zoning. In any case, subsequent residents who want to move into a cell may do so, as long as the cell is not fully occupied up to the maximum allowable density.
Demand for service centers
New service centers are created every time a specific number of residents enters the lattice (exogenously set to 100 in the experiments reported here). These service centers choose an empty cell close to where the most recent resident located and where the permitted density is at least 0.25 (which equates to more than one resident per cell). This modeling choice is based on literature suggesting that businesses follow exurban residents in pursuit of a client and employee base, and in anticipation of development trends (see, for example, Cohen, 2000; Lang, 2000) . Moreover, there is evidence that`b usiness in suburbia is not accreting around a few major growth poles, but now disperses throughout metropolitan areas'' (Lang, 2000, page 7 ). In our model, we attempted to capture some of these aspects into a generalized representation of a service center while keeping the model relevant to our question about zoning, and its interaction with residential preferences and development externalities.
Because agents prefer to be near service centers, and service centers tend to follow residents, a positive feedback is induced, similar to the forces of agglomeration or preferential attachment. On the other hand, to the extent that residents prefer lower densities (or avoid density-induced negative externalities, see section 2.3.3), there will be a pressure to sprawl over the landscape. The interaction of these conflicting pressures, as modulated by the particular preferences of the residents and by any existing zoning constraints, drive the dynamics and settlement patterns generated by this ABM.
Externalities of development
In some experiments described in this paper, the exogenously set aesthetic quality of each cell is attenuated by the development in the cell and its eight neighbor cells. In particular, we define the land-use impact (I ) on cell z caused by the development of cell z and its neighbors as:
where d z is the local development density of cell z (set to 1 for service centers), d j is the development density of the immediate neighboring cell j, n is the number of neighbor cells of cell z (8 except at the edges). The value of I for each cell is updated as new residents enter the lattice; that is, as development densities change over time. When new residents evaluate cells for settlement, the exogenously established aesthetic quality for each cell is reduced proportionally to the corresponding I measure. Residents use this modified value of aesthetic quality in their utility function. Thus, as the density of development increases it lowers the aesthetic quality of a cell, making it less attractive to new residents. Additionally, the utility of established residents decreases as development in their cell and the immediate neighborhood increases.
The impact of development represents an externality associated with the negative effects that individual location decisions have on their immediate neighbors, current and eventual. Although not represented as a decrease in price, it shows the decrease in value (that is, utility) for residential location due to development.
Hypotheses and experiments
Our hypotheses relate zoning, resident preference, and externalities to the patterns of development and the distribution of utility among agents. The hypotheses that we sought to test were:
H1. Density-preference heterogeneity can lead to more compact patterns, depending on the average-density preferred.
H2. Diverse populations preferring higher densities result in higher levels and more equal distributions of utility.
H3. Zoning can limit the spatial extent of development.
H4. Zoning increases the average utility and results in more equal utility distributions among residents.
H5. The utility effects of zoning are more pronounced when externalities are present.
For the computational experiments to test our hypotheses, entering residents are assigned a preference for density that is drawn from a normal distribution, defined by a mean and a variance (resampling occurs until the agent value is in the 0^1 range). Our experiments (summarized in table 1) involved first varying the mean of the distribution for the agents' ideal cell densities ( b c ) from low (0X19 one resident per cell), to medium (0X50 two residents per cell), to high (1X0 five residents per cell). These computational experiments were conducted with zero variance (homogeneous preferences) and with a variance of 0.1 (heterogeneous preferences). Only one magnitude for variance was tested; earlier studies showed that it is the presence of variability that is significant to the spatial and utility measures, and that the amount of variability is less important (Brown and Robinson, 2006; Rand et al, 2002) .
Next, the zoning parameter r was set to one of three values in all cells, 0.0 (no variance granted), 0.5 (some flexibility in granting variances), or 1.0 (free-market conditions), to test for the varying degrees of regulatory intervention. All the parameter settings were repeated for cases in which land-use impact [I, see equation (4)] did and did not affect aesthetic quality.
The model was run thirty times (with different seeds for the random-number generator) for all combinations of parameter settings. Each run started with one service center placed in the center of the lattice before any residents were added. The input zoning map consists of an 80 Â 80 array of permitted densities following a monocentric pattern, that is, the highest density was allowed at the center, with decreasing densities towards the periphery (see figure 1) . Initial aesthetic quality values were set at 0.5 throughout the entire lattice, so that changes in this value only correspond to the effects of development in scenarios where the land-use impact externality, I, is active. We describe the model outcomes using measures that include urban profiles composed of the average residential density of each ring of cells at increasing distances from the initial service center (figures 2^7), the amount of developed cells beyond a 30-cell radius from the center of the lattice, the average utility of residents as defined by equation (2), and the Gini coefficient of utility to measure the utility distribution among the population. The last three measures are taken at the end of each run of the model, that is, at t 450 (tables 2 and 3). (3) At 450 steps, 4500 agents enter a 6400-cell world. Given minimum zoning (1 agent per cell) at most two thirds of the lattice will be filled. Still, we tested the model with shorter time periods (t 350) to examine whether there were edge effects distorting our results at 450 steps, but these differences were minimal and did not affect our conclusions.
us to gain a basic understanding of the dynamics of residential location, and insights regarding the effects of zoning ordinances and their level of enforcement.
Results and discussion
In this section we test the various hypotheses outlined above, given the spatial outputs and the metrics of sprawl, average utility level, and utility distribution produced by the model under different experimental settings (scenarios). We explain differences between different scenarios in terms of the interaction of preferred densities, preference heterogeneity, zoning enforcement, and externalities (figures 2^7, tables 2 and 3). All the differences mentioned in the results below are statistically significant at the 95% level, except where noted otherwise. We also compare mapped outputs from single model runs to illustrate the spatial heterogeneity that results under different zoning conditions (figure 8). 4.1 Hypotheses H1. Density-preference heterogeneity can lead to more compact patterns, depending on the average-density preferred
With no zoning restrictions ( r 1X0), not surprisingly, lower preferred densities resulted in flatter urban profiles (that is, less steep gradients in figure 2 ) and higher measures of sprawl (table 2) . Heterogeneity, however, allowed for significantly more compact development when the mean of the distribution was the lowest; when introducing heterogeneity ( b c normal, 0.19, 0.1), the density profile closely resembled the one formed with homogeneous preferences for medium density ( b c normal, 0.50, 0.0). Although the differences in the sprawl measure remained significant when heterogeneity was added, they were much smaller than with homogeneous preferences. When the mean of the density preference was the highest ( b c normal, 1.0, 0.1), heterogeneity introduced a scattering effect as the mix of preferences included those for lower densities, producing a pattern that is not distinguishable from the one produced with medium densities. Thus, the effects of heterogeneity was to attenuate the extreme results from uniform high-density preferences and even more so for uniform low-density preferences. Confirming previous findings (Brown and Robinson, 2006; Parker and Meretsky, 2004; Rand et al, 2002) , negative externalities associated with development encourage sprawl [figure 2(b), r 1X0 in tables 2 and 3], because the greater impact of higher densities on agent's evaluations induced residents to prefer locations that were isolated from development. Again, heterogeneity attenuated the effects of extreme preference means and reduced the differences in sprawl between populations with different density preferences. When the preference distribution was homogeneous and the mean was the lowest density there was no difference with externalities because, in our model, externalities are generated by increasing density, that is, by congestion. Thus, at low densities (b c normal, 0.19, 0.0), the influence from congestion on location was minimal and settlement spread out, even without externalities. 
Hypothesis H2. Diverse populations preferring higher densities result in higher levels and more equal distributions of utility
In free-market conditions ( r 1X0) and homogeneous populations ( b c normal, *, 0.0), average utility increased and Gini coefficients decreased (that is, utility was more equally distributed) with increasing density preferred (table 2) . This effect can be explained by the fact that when residents prefer low density many are pushed away from service centers as cells fill up. This reduces utility levels for many agents while only a few enjoy greater access to service centers. Preference for higher densities allows a greater number of agents to be satisfied with their location as more residents can move into the same area, increasing the overall utility levels. In addition, higher densities allow for greater accessibility as more residents can locate closer to service centers and a greater number of centers locate close to residential clusters, thus increasing the utility of agents. Even when externalities were present (table 3) , these general trends were maintained. There was an exception, however, in the comparison between medium and high densities ( b c normal, 0.50, 0.0 versus b c normal, 1.0, 0.0), where the congestion costs became greater than the accessibility benefits derived from higher densities.
In heterogeneous populations ( b c normal, *, 0.1) the effect of increasing preferred density on utility measures was weaker than in homogeneous populations (that is, the difference in utility measures was smaller) (table 2) introduces greater competition for sites as more land is needed, even if, on average, residents prefer higher densities. When externalities were present (table 3) , the effects on average utility were maintained, but not so on the Gini coefficients; the distributional difference across preferred densities were insignificant, likely because in all levels of preference there was a variety of development densities whose negative effects were spread throughout the lattice, reducing any equity gains that may have resulted from higher densities.
Comparing the utility outcomes within each level of preference for density ( b c normal, *, 0.0 versus b c normal, *, 0.1), we can isolate the effect of heterogeneity for each level of preference (table 2). Preference for low density ( b c normal, 0.19, 0.0 versus b c normal, 0.19, 0.1) tended to increase the average utility and reduce the Gini coefficient (that is, it increased the equality of utility distribution). Introducing heterogeneity in the low-density scenario had a more dramatic effect on the ability of agents to group in higher densities. On the other hand, when preferred densities were medium ( b c normal, 0.50, 0.0 versus b c normal, 0.5, 0.1) or high (b c normal, 1.00, 0.0 versus b c normal, 1.00, 0.1) a growing number of agents competing for high-density space greatly reduced the possibility of accommodating the demand of residents preferring lower densities, lowering the average utility and producing more unequal distributions. When externalities were present (table 3), the same trends were observed, although the levels of utility were lower overall, and the distribution was more equitable as the negative effects were distributed across the population.
Hypothesis H3. Zoning can limit the spatial extent of development
When zoning was enforced with increasing strictness, residential development was forced towards the center of the lattice, resulting in steeper gradients (figures 3^7, compared with figure 2) and a lower number of developed cells beyond the 30-cell radius from the center of the lattice (tables 2 and 3). Zoning did not have much effect when preference was homogeneous for low density (figure 3, tables 2 and 3) because low-density development was not restricted in this model. In general, heterogeneous distributions of density preferences produced urban profiles that were less affected by levels of zoning enforcement, that is, there was less separation between the curves in figures 5 and 7 than in figures 4 and 6. (Although the differences were small, they were significant between more points in the curves of figures 4 and 6, particularly between the extreme scenarios of r 0 and r 1.) The wider variety of preferences could be satisfied at more locations even when zoning was enforced. The effect of zoning was greater when higher densities were preferred, and when externalities were present. In the first instance, zoning greatly limited the available choices for residents who preferred higher densities, so that if it was enforced to some degree, most of the residents were constrained to the center of the lattice; a very different pattern resulted when residents were allowed to disperse towards the periphery. Externalities tended to increase dispersion; zoning regulations counteracted this force, also forcing a monocentric pattern to emerge.
The cell-density patterns resulting from typical runs, corresponding to heterogeneous preferences for medium and high density combined with low and high zoning flexibility, illustrate the spatial heterogeneity resulting from the model runs (figure 8). These scenarios were selected because heterogeneous preferences are more realistic than homogeneous ones, and preference for heterogeneous medium density produced an urban profile similar to that of heterogeneous low-density preference. When zoning was strictly enforced [figures 8(a) and 8(b)], the patterns produced by residents with preference for medium density [figure 8(a)] were understandably more scattered than when the population preferred higher densities [ figure 8(b) ]. Although the final layout of the settlement included a degree of randomness, this variability was limited by zoning, which tended to concentrate development around the center of the lattice. However, when the preferred density was medium [figure 8(a)], development occurred around a more diffuse center. The resulting patterns are clearly different when there was complete zoning flexibility [figures 8(c) and 8(d)]; cell densities did not concentrate at the center of the map. In the case where medium densities were preferred, development was scattered more randomly than when zoning was enforced. When preferred densities were high, clusters of higher density formed close to each other resembling a polycentric layout and extending in different directions. These results show how path-dependent development can play a key role in urban sprawl: from run to run we see the exact locations of dense development vary, in this case depending on where service centers happen to locate early in each run. Zoning can therefore reduce the effects of stochasticity in the process of residential development. The value of increased certainty is not accounted for as a measure in this model, but policy makers may consider it important as they plan for infrastructure development and the protection of sensitive areas.
4.4 Hypothesis H4. Zoning increases the average utility and results in more equal utility distributions among residents
Our experimental results did not support this hypothesis. Increasingly strict zoning reduced average utility levels and made the distribution of utility less equitable (that is, resulted in higher Gini coefficients). This could result from the fact that residents were limited in their search for preferred locations (see the progression of utility values from r 0X0 to r 1X0 in table 2). This effect tended to be insignificant when the preferred density was low ( b c normal, 0.19, *), or medium in a homogeneous population ( b c normal, 0.50, 0.0), but became significant with higher preferred densities and heterogeneity, likely by reducing the utility gains of those preferring higher densities, while guaranteeing locations with lower densities. Since zoning restrictions only affected those who preferred higher densities, limiting zoning variances reduced the number of cells suitable for preferences for higher densities. An unregulated land market ( r 1X0) allowed agents preferring higher densities to find suitable cells more successfully.
4.5 Hypothesis H5. The utility effects of zoning are more pronounced when externalities are present Given that our model did not support hypothesis H4, we discuss here the effects on utility of zoning when externalities were present. The general trend on utility levels and distribution with increasing zoning enforcement was maintained when externalities were present (table 3) . Externalities induced the dispersal of agents, but zoning limited the areas into which they could move, further reducing utility measures. The main difference in the scenario with no externalities was that the level of enforcement did not seem to matter as much, only whether zoning was enforced to some degree. The utility gains were likely already reduced by the externalities, so that strict or partial zoning did not have much influence over utility distribution.
Contrary to our hypothesis, a free-market environment ( r 1X0) produced the highest average utility measures in almost every case when externalities were present, by permitting development at the preferred densities everywhere in the lattice, and possibly by reducing the concentration of high-density development in large areas that would affect more resident agents negatively.
Policy implications
The computational experiments presented here explored the influence of three factors (preferences, externalities, and zoning enforcement) and their interactions on patterns of land-use settlement in an exurban setting. Some of the results generated by the model suggest possible avenues of exploration for policy makers. First, an assumption that most residents prefer low densities may be appropriate, but assuming homogeneous preferences, as stated by several critics of high-density development (for example, Ehrenhalt, 2000; Gordon and Richardson, 1998; Henderson and Moore, 1998) , is likely to be unrealistic. Heterogeneous distributions are, in fact, supported by survey data (Chin, 2002; Ewing, 1997; Fernandez et al, 2005) . Even if low densities are preferred on average, cities tend to be as compact as when the mean of the preference distribution is medium, and not too different from cities formed when the mean of the heterogeneous distribution is high. When higher densities are preferred, heterogeneity disperses development, because it introduces some residents who prefer lower densities, and thus less compact patterns emerge. Nevertheless, our model results also suggest that as the mean of the preference distribution increases there are utility gains from allowing more compact forms to emerge. Forcing these forms into a monocentric pattern through zoning, however, eliminates these gains because it does not allow higher densities to concentrate where residents want them. Therefore, allowing for settlement patterns to be more compact better accommodates the diversity of density preferences.
Externalities result in excess expansion and lower average utility. Interestingly, externalities also reduce disparities, likely by reducing the gains of high-density development. Zoning can counteract sprawl but at the expense of the distribution of utility among residents and without solving the problem caused by externalities. Externalities of development should therefore be addressed through internalization processes (for example, green taxes), rather than zoning. When agents prefer lower densities, zoning does not make much difference in any output measures. If lower density is the predominant preference, as critics of high-density development claim, zoning would not be a threat. Zoning is an obstacle, however, when preferred densities are higher. Nevertheless, zoning is a useful mechanism to concentrate and control the evolution of urbanization. A free-market environment often leads to greater spatial uncertainty that, given the irreversibility and path dependence of urbanization, can lock the system into undesirable patterns.
A difficult aspect of designing planning policies is that cities are a result of multiple factors interacting at different temporal and spatial scales, making it increasingly difficult to anticipate future trends and comprehend their impacts. ABMs allow us to integrate concepts from urban economics and planning in order to explore systematically the growth and evolution of an urban area by modeling how developers, residents, and service providers use external information to make their location decisions. By representing the multilevel characteristics of such interactions in an abstract form, our ABM can be used to evaluate alternative scenarios and help to draw general principles that may be applied to urban-policy design, without the complications and uncertainties introduced by more realistic models. The results presented here suggest important implications regarding the predictions and assumptions made by developers, planners, Smart Growth advocates, and economists about the types of development that need to be supported with regulation, and those that do not need regulatory support. In order to extract useful policy implications from the general principles derived here, this basic model could be extended to represent more realistic contexts. These extensions are discussed in the following section.
Future work
The ABM presented here represents further steps in an ongoing modeling effort. The experiments carried out so far can be thought of as attempts to establish basic`face validity' for the ABM; that is, to show that its behavior matches our basic expectations and intuitions, and to provide insight into further research directions. The overall goal of these steps is to increase the usefulness of the model for policy design by incorporating mechanisms and features deemed essential for understanding the influence of zoning on land-use patterns, while not making the model too complicated to understand. Ours is meant to be an exploratory model to show how various assumptions about preferred densities, population heterogeneity, and externalities support different sides of the argument about zoning.
One series of future experiments could study the effects of a variety of zoning maps (for example, polycentric versus monocentric layouts), as well as a more realistic representation of service-center zoning and of the road infrastructure that influences the location choices of both types of agent. Besides experimenting with high-density restrictions, we could also explore the effects of limiting low-density development. In the model described here, agents can always settle at densities lower than zoning allows, whereas in some cases zoning constrains density to be both above and below certain levels.
Another line of research would involve allowing agents that are unhappy about the evolution of their surroundings after they have settled in the area to consider moving in pursuit of higher utility values. This might lead to greater expansion of settled areas (sprawl) and levels of utility that fluctuate over time. It would be informative to relate levels of utility to agents of different density preference, so that the winners and losers in land-use decisions can be identified in each scenario.
Another line of extension to this research would involve adding different endogenous mechanisms to control the granting of zoning variances. For example, communities usually have a history of granting (or not granting) zoning variances, and this history will affect the likelihood that future variances will be granted. Additionally, when a zoning variance is granted in a location, it might also increase the likelihood that zoning will be relaxed in neighboring areas, because court challenges and variance grants set precedents that increase the likelihood of future variance applications being successful.
We also could text the effectiveness of zoning in relation to market-based approaches to internalizing externalities, such as green taxes. Additionally, measures of ecological impact could be included in order to compare scenarios in terms of their environmental quality, beyond levels of utility. This would also reflect externalities at various scales. Concentrating development may reduce utility levels locally but would enhance regional environmental quality by preserving land and ecological functions from intense development. Of course extensions such as these, involving market and ecological mechanisms, would likely increase model complexity significantly, a trade-off that needs to be examined.
Finally, geographic and demographic data of a particular case can associate density preferences, levels of development, and environmental quality to actual georeferenced data. This will allow us to bring more detail to the relationship between preferences and development patterns, as well as to the role of land-use policy in reducing different types of externalities and improving well-being. Survey work would complement this work and allow us to pursue the empirical questions raised by the experiments discussed here, by providing more information about residents' satisfaction with their location and about housing prices from which market effects of zoning can be estimated. Some of this work is underway.
The ultimate goal of our ongoing research is to determine whether specific urban patterns are more detrimental to the environment than the gains these patterns allow in average utility and utility distribution. What we have learned so far is that there are no absolutes; the impacts of urban development depend on how the particular development occurs (externalities), how residents value both their preferred lifestyle and their environment (preferences for density and aesthetic quality), and how zoning is enforced. Moreover, the interaction between these factors is often not linear. In this context, it is, of course, more difficult to determine what is an appropriate policy, but insisting on compact development versus sprawl, or strict zoning versus free market, without evidence will not help move the debate forward. Instead, the use of analytical tools such as our model can help to develop insight into the relevant interactions in urban development and to direct further empirical research, enabling support for appropriate planning efforts.
